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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (ADA), Jeffrey B. Newman appeals from 
the district court's October 20, 1994 order entering judgment 
against him and in favor of GHS Osteopathic, Inc.-Parkview 
Hospital Division, following a bench trial.  The appeal raises 
significant issues regarding compliance with discovery 
obligations and the burden of proof under the ADA.  We will 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 We largely draw our statement of the facts from the 
district court's opinion.  Prior to the layoff that led to this 
lawsuit, Newman worked as a physical therapy aide in Parkview's 
rehabilitation department.  Newman suffers from a form of 
nocturnal epilepsy, and he takes medication several times a day 
to prevent the onset of seizures.  The medication makes Newman 
drowsy, and therefore he sought to combine the 30-minute lunch 
break and the two 15-minute morning and afternoon breaks which 
Parkview granted into one hour-long break.  Newman used this hour 
to nap and negate the medication's side effects.  Although 
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Parkview's policy prohibited bunching the breaks, several other 
employees combined them as well. 
 In May 1992, Kamille Sprenkle of Rehab America, an 
independent contractor agency, began working with Parkview's 
Director of the Rehabilitation Department to assist in 
supervising and running the department.  Soon thereafter, she 
began enforcing the policy against combining the breaks.1  When 
Newman protested that he needed to combine the time for medical 
reasons, Sprenkle referred him to Jennifer Brown, Parkview's 
director of human resources.  Brown, in turn, told Newman that to 
be exempt from the policy, he would need authorization from a 
hospital physician.  Brown also agreed to exempt Newman from the 
policy pending the medical evaluation.  App. 447.  A physician 
"subsequently recommended that [Newman] be allowed to continue 
combining his breaks because such bunching was a reasonable 
medical necessity."  App. 448. 
 Beginning in 1992, the hospital's financial situation 
began to deteriorate, and it instituted a reduction in hours for 
much of its staff, including Newman.  Later that year, the 
hospital began planning more cuts, including layoffs.  In 
February 1993, Ernest Perilli, Parkview's associate executive 
director of operations, determined that one full-time 
nonprofessional position in the rehabilitation department should 
be eliminated, and he consulted Sprenkle (who was on maternity 
                     
1The district court found that "at a January, 1993 meeting of the 
department heads, Sprenkle was told by her boss at Parkview that 
the policy against combining the breaks would now be enforced."  
App. 447. 
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leave) for assistance.  She in turn recommended that Parkview 
eliminate the position of full-time physical therapy aide. Newman 
was the only employee holding that position.  Effective February 
19, 1993, the hospital laid off Newman and six other employees. 
 On February 5, 1994, Newman filed a complaint against 
Parkview in the district court, alleging that its decision to lay 
him off constituted unlawful discrimination under the ADA. 
Specifically, Newman alleged, among other things, that his layoff 
resulted from Sprenkle's irritation with his medical need to 
combine the breaks.  He contended that "[u]pon [his] exercise of 
his ability to continue his break consolidation, Ms. Sprenkle 
became belligerent in attitude with him."  Br. at 5.  He further 
supported his complaint with certain allegations of actions that 
occurred after the layoff, which he contended demonstrated that 
Parkview's proffered reasons for his layoff were pretextual.2 
 During pretrial discovery, Newman propounded 
interrogatories on Parkview seeking identification of each person 
Parkview believed had knowledge of his claims and each person it 
intended to call at trial.  Newman also sought to learn the 
                     
2For instance, Newman says he was told he could take a part-time 
position as a physical therapy aide without benefits but that he 
would have to bump his friend out of the position.  The district 
court found that Newman did not take the position because he did 
not want to cause his friend to be laid off. Newman also points 
out that soon after his one-year right to recall had expired, a 
part time aide was given a full time position.  The district 
court attributed this latter development to the fact that 
Parkview had hired a new independent contractor to supply 
professional positions to the rehabilitation department and that 
"the new contractor's aggressive marketing practices . . . 
resulted in a much higher volume of patients in the 
rehabilitation department at Parkview."  App. 451. 
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substance of each prospective witness' testimony.  Parkview 
responded by, among other things, referring to its self-executing 
disclosures, objecting to the scope of the interrogatory 
requests, and stating that it had not identified its trial 
witnesses.  Its self-executing disclosures stated that: 
Defendant believes the following persons are 
reasonably likely to have information that 
bears significantly on the claims or defenses 
in this matter: 
 
Jennifer M. Brown 
 
Plaintiff's job performance; the 
Hospital's attempts to accommodate 
Plaintiff's alleged disability; 
Hospital-wide layoff of February, 
1993; Hospital policies and 
procedures. 
 
Kamille Sprenkle 
 
Plaintiff's job performance; the 
decision to eliminate the position 
of full-time Physical Therapy Aid; 
conversations with Plaintiff 
regarding his request for an 
accommodation. 
 
Ernest Perilli 
 
Hospital-wide layoffs of February, 
1993; Hospital policies and 
procedures. 
 
Newman claims that he never received this list and he further 
observes that the names and the substance of their testimony were 
not supplied in response to his interrogatories.  Therefore, he 
made an in limine motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 to exclude the 
testimony of Perilli and Brown on the ground that their names and 
the substance of their testimony were not properly disclosed 
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during pretrial discovery.  On October 11, 1994, the district 
court held a hearing at which it heard argument from both sides. 
The court concluded that Newman received either the list itself 
or the cover letter attaching the list.  It further determined 
that even if the latter was the case, it should have been obvious 
that an enclosure was missing, and Newman should have contacted 
Parkview's counsel to obtain the missing enclosure.  The court 
therefore denied Newman's motion, and the case proceeded to a 
non-jury trial at which Perilli and Brown testified on October 11 
and 12. 
 On October 20, the court issued a bench opinion setting 
forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The court 
found that Parkview's decision was motivated by legitimate 
economic reasons arising from its deteriorating financial 
situation.  It further found that Sprenkle harbored no animosity 
toward Newman and only reluctantly recommended that Newman's 
position be eliminated.  Consequently, that same day the court 
entered judgment in Parkview's favor.  Newman timely filed this 
appeal.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II.  
 Newman's primary contention is that the district court 
erred by permitting Perilli and Brown to testify.  He claims that 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a), 26(e) and 37(c)(1) 
required the district court to exclude their testimony. 
 As amended in 1993, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) provides 
for self-executing disclosures, as it requires a party upon its 
7 
own initiative to disclose "the name and, if known, the address 
and telephone number of each individual likely to have 
discoverable information relevant to disputed facts . . . ."  
Rule 26(a)(3)(A) requires disclosure of "the name . . . of each 
witness, separately identifying those whom the party expects to 
present and those whom the party may call if the need arises." 
Furthermore, Rule 26(a)(5) provides that a party may discover 
additional matter through, inter alia, written interrogatories. 
Under Rule 26(e), a party is under a continuing obligation to 
supplement its discovery responses. 
 As also revised in 1993, Rule 37(c)(1) provides that a 
party who  
without substantial justification fails to 
disclose information required by Rule 26(a) 
or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is 
harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at 
trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any 
witness or information not so disclosed.  In 
addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the 
court, on motion and after affording an 
opportunity to be heard, may impose other 
appropriate sanctions. 
 
Rule 37 is written in mandatory terms, and "is designed to 
provide a strong inducement for disclosure of Rule 26(a) 
material."  Harlow v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7162 
at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1995).  Nonetheless, the rule expressly 
provides that sanctions should not be imposed if substantial 
justification exists for the failure to disclose, or if the 
failure to disclose was harmless.  Thus, the rule does not leave 
district courts without discretion.  See, generally, Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 37(c) (Advisory Committee Notes).  In fact, one court has held 
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that "[n]otwithstanding Rule 37(c), the district court may be 
found to have abused its discretion if [its] exclusion of 
testimony results in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the 
case."  Orjias v. Stevenson, 31 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir.) 
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 511 (1994); see also 
Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 432 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting 
Rule 37(c)(1)) (In ruling on motion to call witness not 
previously identified, "'district court should consider prejudice 
or surprise to opposing party, ability of party to cure 
prejudice, likelihood of disruption, and moving party's bad faith 
or unwillingness to comply.'") (citation omitted).  For our 
purposes, then, even under Rule 37, "[t]he imposition of 
sanctions for abuse of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37 is a 
matter within the discretion of the trial court."  Orjias, 31 
F.3d at 1005; Doe v. Johnson, 53 F.3d 1448, 1464 (7th 1995) ("We 
review the district court's decision to impose Rule 37 sanctions 
for abuse of discretion.").    
 We find no abuse of discretion here.  After hearing 
argument from both sides, the district court concluded that the 
witnesses were identified in Parkview's self-executing 
disclosures and that Newman, at a minimum, received the covering 
letter referring to the list, if not the list itself.  Thus, the 
court concluded that Newman should have sought the list if he had 
not received it.  The court therefore believed that Parkview's 
possible failure to supply the information in its self-executing 
disclosures or to disclose it in response to Newman's 
interrogatories should not have prejudiced him and therefore was 
9 
harmless.  The court's decision is consistent with the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments, which state that the 
"harmless violation" provision was "needed to avoid unduly harsh 
penalties in a variety of situations: e.g., the inadvertent 
omission from a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure of the name of a 
potential witness known to all parties. . . ."  Here, there is no 
reason to believe that Parkview acted in bad faith; and the court 
found that Newman knew the names of its witnesses and the scope 
of their relevant knowledge well before trial.  In the 
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to exclude the testimony. 
 
III. 
 Newman next argues that the district court placed an 
incorrect burden of proof upon him.  As an initial matter, we 
must address the district court's reliance on cases governing 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et 
seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§621-34, to determine the standards for indirectly proving 
disparate treatment under the ADA.3  The parties on appeal assume 
                     
3The district court cited only Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 
457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 186 (1993), a Title VII 
case.  But the standards enunciated under Title VII and the ADEA 
for these types of cases, commonly referred to as pretext cases, 
are derived from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973), and proceed as follows: 
 
First, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by the preponderance of the evidence 
a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, 
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
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that this caselaw informs the standards of causation under the 
ADA and we now so hold.   
 In the context of employment discrimination, the ADA, 
ADEA and Title VII all serve the same purpose -- to prohibit 
discrimination in employment against members of certain classes. 
Therefore, it follows that the methods and manner of proof under 
one statute should inform the standards under the others as well. 
Indeed, we routinely use Title VII and ADEA caselaw 
interchangeably, when there is no material difference in the 
question being addressed.  DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
48 F.3d 719, 724 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995).  And, the provisions of the 
ADA itself recognize the parallel nature of the statutes, as they 
provide that 
[t]he powers, remedies, and procedures set 
forth in [Title VII] shall be the powers, 
                                                                  
defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's 
rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, id.], at 802, 
93 S.Ct. at 1824.  Third, should the 
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff 
must then have an opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext 
for discrimination.  Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct., at 
1825. 
 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-
53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981).  Of course, at the trial stage, 
the only relevant question for the factfinder is whether the 
plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination, and the 
plaintiff can try to persuade the trier of fact of this by 
proving that the employer's proffered reasons for the adverse 
employment decision are pretexts for discrimination.  The trier 
of fact is not required, however, to find intentional 
discrimination simply because it does not believe the employer's 
explanation.  See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 596-97 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (in banc). 
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remedies and procedures this subchapter 
provides to the Commission, to the Attorney 
General, or to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability in 
violation of any provision of this chapter, 
or regulations promulgated under section 
12116 of this title, concerning employment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).   
 In accordance with the foregoing principles, courts 
addressing the allocations of burdens of proof and persuasion 
under the ADA uniformly have looked for guidance to Title VII and 
ADEA caselaw.  See Ennis v. National Ass'n of Business and Educ. 
Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title 
VII burden-shifting rules apply in ADA pretext case); DeLuca v. 
Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.2d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995) (assuming 
that Title VII prima facie case and burden shifting method 
applies under ADA); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 
869 F. Supp. 736, 743 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (applying Title VII prima 
facie case standards to ADA); West v. Russell Corp., 868 F. Supp. 
313, 316 (M.D. Ala. 1994) ("Generally . . . federal courts have 
applied the settled principles of employment discrimination law 
[under Title VII] to the ADA") (citing cases); Doe v. Kohn Nast & 
Grav, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1994); 
Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp. 596, 603 (D. Me. 
1994); See also EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 
1276, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12139 at * 5 (7th Cir. May 22, 1995) 
(applying Title VII and ADEA caselaw to interpretation of 
individual liability under ADA); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. 
v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 
12 
12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (seeking guidance from Title VII caselaw 
to determine definition of "employer" under ADA).   
 In addition, courts routinely employ the Title VII 
burden-shifting rules in pretext cases brought under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., which 
prohibits disability discrimination in public employment.  See 
Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994); Barth v. 
Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ____ 
U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1538 (1994); Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter 
R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ____ 
U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 54 (1992); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 
1339-40 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 
2825 (1991).  As the ADA simply expands the Rehabilitation Act's 
prohibitions against discrimination into the private sector, 
Congress has directed that the two acts' judicial and agency 
standards be harmonized.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 793(d), 
794(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).  Therefore, the district court 
properly looked to ADEA and Title VII caselaw for guidance. 
 The court in this case relied in particular on 
Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
114 S.Ct. 186 (1993), which it interpreted as requiring a 
plaintiff in a pretext case to prove that the illicit motive was 
the sole cause of the adverse employment decision.  We since have 
clarified that in pretext cases a plaintiff need prove only that 
the illicit factor "played a role in the employer's 
decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative effect on 
the outcome of that process."  Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 
13 
586, 598 (3d Cir. 1995) (in banc).  Nevertheless, the court's 
reliance on Griffiths did not prejudice Newman, because it found 
that his disability played no role in Parkview's decision.  In 
its own words: 
Plaintiff's dismissal by the defendant 
resulted from a bona-fide hospital-wide 
reduction in force because of financial 
difficulty and not from any discrimination on 
the part of defendant against plaintiff due 
to plaintiff's disability.  The plaintiff's 
epilepsy was not the sole cause, was not a 
determinative cause, and played no role 
whatsoever in the defendant's decision to 
terminate plaintiff's position or to lay off 
the plaintiff. 
 
App. 453-54.  Thus, irrespective of the applicable test, Newman 
could not prevail.4 
 
IV. 
 In view of the foregoing conclusions, we will affirm 
the judgment of the district court. 
           
 
                     
4Newman argues in the alternative that the district court's 
findings of fact are not supported by the record.  The argument 
is without merit.  "We accept the district court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous."  Oberti v. Board of 
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993); Country Floors, Inc. 
v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1062 (3d Cir. 
1991).  The court found the defendant's witnesses to be credible, 
and essentially believed Parkview's explanation of Newman's 
layoff.  It is well settled that "[c]redibility determinations 
that underlie findings of fact are appropriate to a bench 
verdict," Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1062, and rarely will be 
disturbed.  In this case, the district court's findings are 
adequately supported by the testimony and we decline to disturb 
them. 
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